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INTRODUCTION
On August 2, 2002, the following statements were given under oath to
a federal grand jury:
Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. J.D., American University, 1982. I would like to thank my research
assistant, Christopher E. Everett, for his excellent assistance to me during the past two years.
The capitalization choice in the author's name is her own.
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A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.'
Assume that soon after the speaker made these statements to the grand
jury, the speaker approached his attorney, worried about a possible perjury
charge. He wanted to know if he could clarify his answers to the grand jury.
What would it take to recant his testimony under 18 U.S.C. § 1623? This
Article is an overview of the recantation provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 and
makes a pessimistic assessment of its current usefulness; although Congress
intended § 1623(d) to be an inducement to correct false testimony, it is
nearly impossible for a witness to recant.2
1. Superseding Indictment at 12, United States v. Webber, No. 02-80813, 2003 WL
22173079, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2003) (emphasis omitted). The statements recited are
those attributed to basketball superstar Chris Webber. The statements cited are his actual
statements made to the grand jury; the subsequent use of his statements throughout the re-
mainder of the article is fictional and is used to illustrate the author's points.
2. The statute provides that:
§ 1623. False declarations before grand jury or court
(a) Whoever under oath (or in any declaration, certificate, verification, or state-
ment under penalty of perjury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United
States Code) in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the
United States knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any
other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other
material, knowing the same to contain any false material declaration, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) This section is applicable whether the conduct occurred within or without
the United States.
(c) An indictment or information for violation of this section alleging that, in
any proceedings before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States,
the defendant under oath has knowingly made two or more declarations, which are
inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, need not specify
which declaration is false if -
(1) each declaration was material to the point in question, and
(2) each declaration was made within the period of the statute of limitations
for the offense charged under this section.
In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the in-
dictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that
the defendant while under oath made irreconcilably contradictory declarations ma-
terial to the point in question in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or
grand jury. It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to
the first sentence of this subsection that the defendant at the time he made each
declaration believed the declaration was true.
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a
declaration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to
be false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the
admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or
it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
[Vol. 2006:637
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Under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, a witness's ability to successfully recant his
testimony depends on whether his or her testimony has "substantially af-
fected the proceeding" and whether it is "manifest that [the] falsity has been
or will be exposed."'3 In spite of the conjunctive use of "or" between the
two prongs of this test, the use of a recantation defense is challenging be-
cause of the inconsistent application of this and other key aspects of the
statute. Congress enacted § 1623(d) to serve as an "inducement to the wit-
ness to give truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a
false statement without incurring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so."4
Yet courts disagree as to when the witness can correct the false state-
ment.' The various United States Courts of Appeals issued conflicting in-
terpretations of the provision, and they typically set an unreasonably high
bar that deters the provision's use. This Article discusses how the legisla-
tive history and the courts have added to the confusion surrounding the re-
cantation provision of § 1623 and argues for a replacement that furthers the
congressional intent which led to its enactment.
Part I examines the legislative history of § 1623(d) to discern Con-
gress's legislative intent, as well as the genesis of the current confusion re-
garding the provision's meaning.' This part also covers the legislative his-
tory and the New York recantation statute upon which Congress based the
recantation provision of § 1623. Part II reviews the federal cases that have
applied the recantation provision.' In particular, this part covers material
testimony, 9 the two-prong test," and the conflict between prosecuting under
18 U.S.C. § 1621 rather than § 1623." Finally, Part III provides a rationale
for rewording § 1623 to fulfill congressional intent."2 In addition, this arti-
cle proposes a modification of § 1623(d) that would eliminate the bar that
(e) Proof beyond a reasonable doubt under this section is sufficient for convic-
tion. It shall not be necessary that such proof be made by any particular number of
witnesses or by documentary or other type of evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 1623 (2000).
3. Id. § 1623(d).
4. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 48 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,
4024.
5. The timing of the recantation is limited by whether both prongs of § 1623(d)
have to be satisfied or just one of the prongs. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part I.A.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. See infra Part II.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part II.D. While this Article will mainly focus on § 1623, it will also
cover § 1621 regarding the possible constitutional issues for a perjurer who recanted pursu-
ant to § 1623(d) but is being charged under § 1621 so that the government can avoid the
affirmative defense provided by § 1623(d).
12. See infra Part Ill.
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makes recantation under § 1623 unattainable and the possible constitutional
issues that arise when a perjurer is charged under § 1621 instead of § 1623.11
I. HISTORY
A. History of the Federal Recantation Statute
The short legislative history of the recantation provision in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623 has created an ambiguity as to Congress's intent. The legislative
history clearly states that § 1623 is modeled after New York Penal Law
section 210.25."4 This statute has the word "and" between the first and sec-
ond prong of the two-prong test and requires both prongs to be satisfied for
a successful recantation defense.' 5 However, Congress enacted § 1623(d)
with the word "or" between the prongs. 6 A court interpreting the recanta-
tion statute faces a dilemma: it must either follow the meaning of § 1623(d)
as it appeared in the New York statute, or instead follow the plain meaning
of the text of § 1623(d). This issue manifests itself in the two-prong test
that allows recantation only when "the declaration has not substantially af-
fected the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has
been or will be exposed."' 7
On one hand, it is assumed that Congress was aware of the ramifica-
tions of changing the terminology in the federal statute from that used in the
New York statute. On the other hand, since the congressional intent behind
§ 1623 was to "induce[] ... the witness... to correct a false statement,"'" it
is unlikely that Congress would have heightened the recantation bar by
changing the meaning of "or" to "and," thus making it more difficult to use.
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits have all
construed the congressional intent in enacting § 1623(d) to be to "balance[]
13. See infra Part III.
14. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 47-48 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4007, 4023-24. House Report 1549 provides:
Section 1623(d), as amended, provides that when in the same continuous court or
grand jury proceeding in which a declaration is made, the person making the decla-
ration admits that it is false, the admission will bar prosecution under this section
if, at the time the admission is made, the declaration has not substantially affected
the proceeding, or it has not become manifest that the falsity will be exposed. This
recantation or retraction provision is modeled upon a New York penal statute.
(N.Y. Penal Law 210.25.) It serves as an inducement to the witness to give truthful
testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incur-
ring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so.
Id.
15. See infra note 30.
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See H.R. Rep No. 91-1549, supra note 14.
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the need to encourage a witness to correct his testimony against the need to
prevent his perjury at the outset."' 9 Using this reasoning, these circuits held
that both prongs of the test must be satisfied for a witness to recant his tes-
timony.2" In contrast, the Eighth Circuit, using the same reasoning, held that
the plain meaning of the statute is the proper interpretation of § 1623(d).2'
The plain meaning of § 1623(d) only requires one of the prongs to be satis-
fied.22
The House Report,23 the Senate Report,24 and the testimony of Senator
John L. McClellan25 each employ "or" between the prongs of § 1623(d).
However, the Department of Justice's comments used "and" between "sub-
stantially affect" and "manifest," which is the only place where the legisla-
tive history deviates from the understanding that the law is modeled upon
the more witness-friendly New York statute.26 Therefore, the question is
19. United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 617 (5th Cir. 1981); accord, e.g., United
States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Scrimgeour, 636
F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1985);
United States v. Fomaro, 894 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Sherman, 150
F.3d 306, 316-18 (3d Cir. 1998).
20. See, e.g., Moore, 613 F.2d at 1043-45; Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d at 1024; Scivola,
766 F.2d at 45; Fornaro, 894 F.2d at 511; Sherman, 150 F.3d at 317-18.
21. United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1994).
22. See id
23. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, at 33, 47-48, as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007,
4008, 4023-24. House Report 1549 provides:
TITLE IV - FALSE DECLARATIONS
This title is intended to facilitate Federal perjury prosecutions and establishes a
new false declaration provision applicable in Federal grand jury and court proceed-
ings. It abandons the so-called two-witness and direct evidence rule in such prose-
cutions and authorizes a conviction based on irreconcilably inconsistent declara-
tions under oath. As amended, title IV also permits recantation to be a bar to
prosecution if the declaration has not substantially affected the proceedings or it
has not become manifest that the declaration's falsity has been or will be exposed.
Id. at 33.
24. S. REP. No. 91-617, at 150 (1969). Senate Report 617 provides:
Recantation may be a bar to a prosecution under this provision if at the time the
admission is made, the false declaration had not substantially affected the proceed-
ing or it had not become manifest that such falsity has been or would be exposed.
See N.Y. Penal Law § 210.25. This provision codifies dictum in present case law
under 18 U.S.C. § 1621. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 573, 574
(1937).
Id.
25. Organized Crime Control: Hearing on S. 30 and Related Bills Before H.R. Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91 st Cong. 83 (1970) (statement of Sen. John L.
McClellan) ("Provision is made for recantation before a proceeding has been substantially
affected or the falsity has become manifest.").
26. Organized Crime Control: Hearing on S. 30 and Related Bills Before H.R. Sub-
comm. No. 5 of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 164 (1970) (comments of the De-
partment of Justice). The relevant portion of the Department of Justice's comments reads:
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which interpretation of the statute follows the congressional intent that the
recantation provision is "an inducement to the witness to give truthful testi-
mony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without
incurring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so?
' 27
The legislative history does not explicitly indicate whether Congress
recognized the ambiguity created in § 1623 by replacing "and" with "or."
Courts note this lack of recognition when analyzing the recantation provi-
sion.28 The only clear part of the legislative history is that Congress in-
tended perjurers to have some opportunity to retract the false statement
without the risk of prosecution. Thus, any changes to § 1623 that would
ease the burden on defendants to utilize the recantation provision would be
in accordance with the congressional intent of inducing truthful testimony.2 9
B. History of the New York Perjury Statute
The recantation provision of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 is based on New York
Penal Law section 210.25,30 which itself is based3" on the 1957 Court of
Appeals of New York case People v. Ezaugi 2 Since Congress specifically
stated that § 1623(d) was modeled after section 210.25," an analysis of the
New York statute enhances an understanding of the congressional intent
behind § 1623(d). The New York recantation statute requires both prongs
to be satisfied before a witness can successfully recant his false testimony:
the recantation must occur "before such false statement substantially af-
If a witness recants in the course of the same continuous court or grand jury pro-
ceeding, a prosecution for false statements will be barred, provided that the repu-
diation is made before it has substantially affected the proceeding, and before it is
evident that the witness' false testimony will be exposed. This provides an incen-
tive to the witness who testifies falsely upon his first appearance to retract his tes-
timony and avoid prosecution by thereafter testifying truthfully.
Id. (emphasis added).
27. See H.R. Rep No. 91-1549, supra note 14.
28. See, e.g., Moore, 613 F.2d at 1042 ("At no time did anyone dispute an intended
identity between [the New York statute and § 1623(d)] in this regard, or reflect a conscious
comprehension of a significant difference. Instead, the matter received very little attention,
and references on the point - invariably passing - were woefully inconclusive.").
29. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
30. Section 210.25 of the New York Penal Law reads: "In any prosecution for per-
jury, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant retracted his false statement in the course
of the proceeding in which it was made before such false statement substantially affected the
proceeding and before it became manifest that its falsity was or would be exposed."
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (McKinney 1999).
31. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25, William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, 351
(McKinney 1999).
32. 141 N.E.2d 580 (N.Y. 1957).
33. See supra notes 14, 24 and accompanying text.
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fected the proceeding and before it became manifest that its falsity was or
would be exposed."34
In Ezaugi, the defendant, a police officer, gave false testimony about
whether money was discussed in a meeting with a drug dealer.35 The police
had tape recorded the conversation and therefore knew at the time of the
false testimony that the defendant had perjured himself.36 After discussing
the testimony with his partner, the defendant reappeared two days later in
front of the grand jury and corrected his false statements.37 The court held
that the recantation defense is only designed to be used when "done
promptly before the body conducting the inquiry has been deceived or mis-
led to the harm and prejudice of its investigation, and when no reasonable
likelihood exists that the witness has learned that his perjury is known or
may become known to the authorities. '38 The court held that Ezaugi did not
recant until after he concluded that his false testimony was not deceiving
anyone and therefore could not utilize the recantation defense. 39  Thus,
viewing the New York recantation statute in light of the holding of the court
in Ezaugi, the requirements of the statute directly mirror the requirements in
Ezaugi.
People v. Gillette' is also important to the analysis of Ezaugi. In Gil-
lette, the defendant stated that a certain bank account was his personal ac-
count and the funds deposited in the account were his own.41 Immediately
following this questioning, the defendant stated that the money he had re-
ceived was from officers of the insurance company and thus the money be-
longed to the insurance company.42 The court held that the defendant was
not guilty of perjury because "he fully and frankly testified as to the funds
in question and the source from which it came."43 Furthermore, the court
held that "[a] judicial ... trial has for its sole object the ascertainment of the
truth."' Therefore, "every inducement to a witness to tell the truth" should
be given and "It]his inducement would be destroyed if a witness could not
correct a false statement except by running the risk of being indicted and
convicted for perjury. ' 4
34. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.25 (emphasis added).
35. Ezaugi, 141 N.E.2d at 581-82.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 582.
38. Id. at 583.
39. See id.
40. 111N.Y.S. 133 (App. Div. 1908).
41. Id. at 134.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 138.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id.
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The New York recantation statute makes the analysis of the congres-
sional intent even more challenging. Viewing the legislative history in light
of the New York recantation statute, it is unclear which wording Congress
intended when it enacted § 1623(d). Regardless of the congressional intent,
however, the issue for anyone wishing to recant is that it is difficult to know
which standard the court will use. The inconsistent application of the recan-
tation test among the different circuits makes the burden to sustain a suc-
cessful recantation defense fortuitous based upon venue.
II. RECANTATION UNDER § 1623
Whether a speaker can recant his testimony depends on the answers to
the following questions:
(A) Was the testimony material?'
(B) What would the speaker have to say to recant?47
(C) Does it matter where in the U.S. the client testified?48
(D) Has the testimony substantially affected the proceedings?49
(E) Is it manifest that the falsity has been or will be exposed?"
(F) Is there reason to worry about 18 U.S.C. § 1621?"'
These questions lead to a determination of whether § 1623(d) allows a wit-
ness to correct false testimony. As illustrated below, the burden on a wit-
ness who recants is so high that the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York has commented that "[t]he recantation de-
fense appears to be an illusion--often asserted but never found."" The in-
ability of a witness to assert a recantation defense frustrates the congres-
sional intent behind the enactment of § 1623(d).
A. Was the Testimony Material?
Let us return to the grand jury testimony given at the beginning of the
article. Suppose the speaker was subpoenaed to appear in front of the grand
jury to answer questions, because the grand jury was investigating a gam-
bling ring that Eddie Martin was suspected of running. 3 The testimony
was:
46. See infra Part II.A.
47. See infra Part II.B.
48. See infra Part II.C.
49. See infra Part II.C. 1.
50. See infra Part II.C.2.
51. See infra Part II.D.
52. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003); see also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
53. See Indictment at 3, United States v. Webber, No. 02-80813, 2003 WL
22173079, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 19, 2003).
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Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
54
One defense to a perjury charge is that the testimony was not material
and, therefore, no perjury was committed. This defense is separate and dis-
tinct from a recantation defense because there is no perjury under § 1623 if
the false testimony was not material.5 The burden on the witness is high
because "the test for materiality is a broad one"56 and "is a legal question to
be decided by the trial court."57 Under this test, a statement is material "if it
is 'capable of influencing the tribunal on the issue before it."'58 The test
also includes any statement that "has 'a natural effect or tendency to influ-
ence, impede, or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing its investigation."' 59
In addition, "[t]he statement need not be material to any particular issue in
the case, but rather may be material to any proper matter of the jury's in-
quiry, including the issue of credibility."'6 In application, almost anything
asked in a grand jury or court proceeding is material, because, even if the
testimony is not about any particular issue, the testimony can affect the
credibility of the witness.6 1
To return to our question: whether the witness's statement that he did
not believe he ever received clothing from Eddie Martin while he was in
college is material? If the grand jury was investigating a gambling opera-
54. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2000).
56. United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Byrnes, 644 F.2d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Giarratano, 622 F.2d 153, 156
(5th Cir. 1980)).
57. Id. (citing United States v. Kehoe, 562 F.2d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 1977); United States
v. Romanow, 509 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir. 1975)).
58. Id. (quoting Giarratano, 622 F.2d at 156).
59. United States v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Carroll v.
United States, 16 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1927)).
60. Scivola, 766 F.2d at 44 (citing Giarratano, 622 F.2d at 156; United States v.
Allen, 409 F. Supp. 562, 565 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 541 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1976)).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 914 F.2d 835, 845-46 (7th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Vap, 852 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643,
654 (1 1th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dudley, 581 F.2d 1193, 1196 (5th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Beitling, 545 F.2d 1106, 1109-10 (8th Cir. 1976). This materiality determination
extends to civil depositions that are under the jurisdiction of § 1623. See United States v.
Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1994). False testimony is material if "a truthful answer
might reasonably be calculated to lead to the discovery of evidence admissible at the trial of
the underlying suit." Id.
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tion by Eddie Martin, the testimony would not necessarily influence, im-
pede, or dissuade any aspect of the grand jury investigation. However, even
if the testimony did not directly affect the grand jury investigation, almost
any testimony would influence the issue of credibility. Therefore, almost all
testimony has been deemed to be material in the context of § 1623(d).
Furthermore, if the grand jury was investigating whether Eddie Martin
had given money and other items to student athletes as part of the overall
investigation of Mr. Martin's suspected gambling ring, and if the speaker
had falsely testified about receiving clothing, then the testimony would have
impeded the grand jury's investigation.62 Accordingly, regardless of the
scope of the grand jury investigation, the testimony is usually going to be
material to the proceeding because, at the very least, the false testimony
affects the issue of credibility.
However, before § 1623 was enacted, the defendant in Beckanstin v.
United States63 had his sentence overturned by the Fifth Circuit because his
false testimony was not material and the defendant did not intend to deceive
the court.' In Beckanstin, the defendant stated that he had graduated from
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and then was interrupted by the
court for a series of questions. 65 At dinner that night Beckanstin's wife
brought up the mistake, pointing out that Beckanstin had not graduated from
MIT, but had merely attended the school.' Beckanstin's lawyer advised
him that it was a minor mistake and not to worry.67 In later testimony,
Beckanstin was confronted with his false testimony and promptly corrected
the mistake.6' The court ruled that the testimony was not material because
"[w]hether or not Beckanstin had graduated from the school was of no con-
sequence in resolving the issues involved in that suit."69 In addition, the
court found that Beckanstin's "[w]illingness to correct the misstatement...
is potent to negative a willful intent to swear falsely. '7' Accordingly,
Beckanstin was able to avoid a perjury prosecution. This outcome is not
likely to repeat itself under § 1623 because the question of materiality has
since been extended to the credibility of the witness, which would have
been affected by his statement that he graduated from MIT when he did not.
62. See Indictment, supra note 53, at 3.
63. 232 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1956).
64. Id. at 3-5.
65. Id. at 2-3.
66. Id. at 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 2006:637
Recantation: Illusion or Reality?
B. What Would the Speaker Have to Say to Recant?
Again, assume that the testimony was the following:
Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
71
What are the requirements if the speaker wants to recant his testimony
because it was false? What does the speaker have to do or say?
One important aspect of 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) is that the "person mak-
ing the declaration admits such declaration to be false. '72 Courts have found
that a witness must make "[a]n outright retraction and repudiation of his
false testimony" to satisfy this aspect of the statute. 3 So, if the witness just
alludes to the fact that he may have falsely testified, then the outright ad-
mission requirement of § 1623(d) is not satisfied.74 In addition, simply ask-
ing the prosecutor to allow the witness to clarify or elaborate some of his
testimony will not satisfy § 1623(d).75 Similarly, a witness's explanation of
his false testimony and what he thought certain words meant will also not
satisfy § 1623(d).76 Lastly, changing one's plea from not guilty to guilty
will not satisfy § 1623(d).77 Thus, the perjurer must make an outright ad-
mission to meet this requirement; trying to skirt around the issue of falsity
will not suffice.
What constitutes "[a]n outright retraction and repudiation of ... false
testimony"?78  Would the following answer constitute a retraction by the
speaker if it occurred in the same grand jury proceeding?
Q: Okay. So you lied, is that correct?
A: To one question.79
71. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
72. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
73. United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1982); accord, e.g.,
United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Scivola, 766
F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1985).
74. See United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1017-18 (1st Cir. 1983).
75. See D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1090-91; United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166,
176-77 (D.D.C. 1974).
76. See Tobias, 863 F.2d at 689.
77. See, e.g., Scivola, 766 F.2d at 45.
78. D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1092.
79. United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1990).
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This testimony would be an outright retraction, since the speaker un-
equivocally stated that he had lied. Returning to the grand jury testimony
given at the beginning of this article, would the following statement consti-
tute a retraction if it occurred after a thirty-eight minute break in the grand
jury testimony?
Q: Is there anything you need to say?
A: Yes, I reviewed my records during the break, and I did receive clothing from
Mr. Eddie Martin while I was in college.
This testimony would also be an outright retraction due to the speaker
unequivocally stating that he had lied.80 Accordingly, as can be extracted
from the above examples of outright retractions, the key to ensuring that a
retraction will be "[a]n outright retraction and repudiation of ... false testi-
mony" 8 is to ensure that the recantation involves unequivocally stating that
one's answer was false and then telling the truth.
The speaker could not simply call the prosecutor the week following
his grand jury testimony and tell the prosecutor that he might have made a
mistake in his testimony and would like to reappear and correct any prob-
lems. In addition, if the speaker asked the prosecutor to stop investigating
him because he has had enough of the harassment and will correct any prob-
lems with his testimony, that would also not satisfy the requirement to make
an outright admission.82 In these situations, the speaker again did not make
"[a]n outright retraction and repudiation of his false testimony [which] is
essential to a 'recantation' within the meaning of the statute.' "83
Additionally, the speaker cannot call the prosecutor the day following
his grand jury testimony and tell the prosecutor that he would like to clarify
some of his testimony and come forward with additional information.84 To
fall within § 1623(d), a recantation must be "[a]n outright retraction and
repudiation of his false testimony." 5  For example, in United States v.
D'Auria, the speaker's request to be recalled, the speaker did not explicitly
state that parts of the prior testimony were false, and thus his request does
not meet the requirements of § 1623(d).86
Could the following statements made by the speaker the day after tes-
tifying be used as a retraction of his testimony?
Q: You testified yesterday that you did not receive any clothing from Mr. Eddie
Martin while you were in college, correct?
80. See United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 345 (8th Cir. 1994).
81. United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. See United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1015-18 (1st Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 1017 (quoting D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1092).
84. See D'Auria, 672 F.2d at 1088, 1092-93.
85. Id. at 1092.
86. See id.
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A: Yes
Q: We have a tape recording of you thanking Mr. Martin for sneakers while you
were in college. Is that your voice on the tape?
A: Yes, but I do not consider sneakers to be included in the definition of clothing.
The speaker's personal definition of clothing would not act as a repu-
diation because "a defendant must unequivocally repudiate his prior testi-
mony to satisfy § 1623(d)." '87 Thus, in United States v. Tobias, for example,
the defendant did not satisfy this requirement by simply trying to give his
"contorted definition" of a word.88
What would happen if the speaker was charged with a crime and was
testifying as to that crime to the grand jury? Would the speaker be able
simply to switch his plea from not guilty to guilty to avoid a perjury charge
from his testimony to the grand jury? The change in plea is not an admis-
sion of falsity that satisfies "the requirements of an effective recantation
under [§] 1623(d)," because "[the witness] did not specifically state that any
parts of his testimony were false."89 "A witness must make an outright re-
traction and repudiation of prior false testimony."' In addition, "'the ac-
cused must come forward and explain unambiguously and specifically
which of his answers' is false.9 Thus, a recantation must involve an out-
right admission of the exact false statements and is not satisfied by simply a
change in pleas.
There are no conflicts between the circuits that an admission to mak-
ing the false testimony is required to recant under § 1623(d).92 Thus, the
ability to use the recantation defense is not affected by the requirement to
give an admission of the false testimony because meeting the requirement is
not impossible or challenging; the witness is only required to state that his
or her testimony was false. Although human nature may be to avoid admit-
ting lies, for a witness to avail himself of § 1623(d) the first step is to admit
the lie, and this step does not create an undue burden on a defendant in at-
tempting to recant false testimony.
C. Does It Matter Where in the U.S. the Speaker Testified?
One aspect of the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 that helps to ele-
vate the recantation defense out of reach is the meaning of "or" in the stat-
ute's text. The "or" is vital to whether the perjurer has to meet one or both
87. United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988).
88. Id.
89. United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir. 1985).
90. Id. (citing United States v. D'Auria, 672 F.2d 1085, 1092 (2d Cir. 1982)).
91. Id. (quoting United States v. Goguen, 723 F.2d 1012, 1018 (1st Cir. 1983)).
92. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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prongs of the test: if "the declaration has not substantially affected the pro-
ceeding, or it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be
exposed." 3 The first prong of the test is whether the false declaration has
"substantially affected the proceeding."94 The second prong of the test is
whether it is manifest that the false declaration "has been or will be ex-
posed."95 The emphasis of this section is on whether one or both parts of
the test have to be satisfied in order to utilize the recantation defense.
The court cases regarding what "or" means are important, because the
burden on finding out the truth is significantly different depending on what
must occur to recant. If both parts of the test must be satisfied, then it will
be more difficult to utilize the recantation defense under § 1623. If only one
part of the test must be satisfied, then the burden on the perjurer to recant is
much lower. Regardless of the test, the burden seems high enough that even
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York has
commented that "[t]he recantation defense appears to be an illusion-often
asserted but never found. 9 6 This seemingly is in conflict with the legisla-
tive history stating that § 1623(d) was "an inducement to the witness to give
truthful testimony by permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement
without incurring the risk [of] prosecution by doing so." '97 Accordingly, the
interpretation of § 1623 by the courts is at such a level that it essentially
bars witnesses from utilizing the recantation defense.98
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and the District of Columbia Circuits
have all construed "or" to have the same meaning as "and."99 These deci-
sions were based on the congressional intent to follow New York Penal Law
section 210.25, which requires both prongs of the test to be satisfied.' In
addition, these decisions sought to ensure that perjurers could not utilize the
recantation provision even after the false testimony is exposed but before it
substantially affects the proceedings, or vice-versa.
Using the same reasoning, but reaching the opposite result, the Eighth
Circuit construed "or" to mean "or."'' The Eighth Circuit took the view
that since "the wording of § 1623(d) 'is plain, simple, and straightforward,
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
97. H.R. REP. No. 91-1549, supra note 4, at 48.
98. See infra Part I.E.
99. See United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 317 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 45 (1st Cir.
1985); United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
100. See Sherman, 150 F.3d at 313-18; Fornaro, 894 F.2d at 510-11; Scivola, 766
F.2d at 45 & n.10; Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d at 1021-24; Moore, 613 F.2d at 1039-43.
101. See United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 346 (8th Cir. 1994).
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the words must be accorded their normal meanings.""" Congress used "or"
and, therefore, Congress's plain language should be used."3 Even using the
plain language of § 1623, the difficulty of utilizing the recantation defense
is still high, but not impossible.
The issue then becomes how the courts should interpret the "or" in §
1623(d), especially since penal statutes are generally interpreted using the
rule of lenity."° "Normally, of course, 'or' is to be accepted for its disjunc-
tive connotation, and not as a word interchangeable with 'and.' But this
canon is not inexorable, for sometimes a strict grammatical construction
will frustrate legislative intent." ' 5 As such, unless the legislative intent is
overwhelming against an interpretation of a statute, then the statute should
be interpreted consistent with the rule of lenity to ensure that criminal con-
duct is clearly described in the statute. °6
The District of Columbia Circuit, in United States v. Moore,"7 stated
that reading "or" in the disjunctive would "frustrate legislative intent."'0 8
The court further stated that Congress specifically modeled § 1623(d) after
the New York statute, so if Congress intended to "switch from combina-
tional to alternative satisfaction of its carefully developed preconditions,"
then "Congress would have said so." '' 9 Additionally, the court stated that
sometimes it is permissible to not use "[t]he strict-construction rule govern-
ing interpretation of criminal statutes.""0 These exceptions occur when the
intention of the legislature would be defeated by the strict construction."'
Thus, the court ruled that the will of Congress must prevail, and § 1623(d)
should be read in the conjunctive, requiring both aspects to be satisfied."2
This is the complete opposite of the Eighth Circuit's conclusion in
United States v. Smith, 1 3 where the court ruled that § 1623(d) should be
102. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987)).
103. See id.
104. See id. (citing Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979)). The rule of
lenity "is rooted in fundamental principles of due process which mandate that no individual
be forced to speculate, at peril of indictment, whether his conduct is prohibited." Dunn, 442
U.S. at 112. In addition, "to ensure that a legislature speaks with special clarity when mark-
ing the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must decline to impose punishment for actions
that are not 'plainly and unmistakably' proscribed." Id. at 112-13 (quoting United States v.
Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
105. United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1979). (citations omit-
ted).
106. See supra note 104.
107. 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 1040.
109. Id. at 1042.
110. Id. at 1044.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1043.
113. 35 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1994).
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interpreted to read as it was written-with the disjunctive "or.""' 4 The court
began by examining the statutory language, which states that the two condi-
tions are disjunctive." 5 The court reasoned, since "the wording of § 1623(d)
'is plain, simple, and straightforward, the words must be accorded their
normal meanings.""" Thus, "the plain language of § 1623(d) [is] control-
ling.""' 7 The court then looked to determine if using "or" in the disjunctive
would defeat the legislative intent behind § 1623(d)." 8 Nothing in the legis-
lative history indicated to the Eighth Circuit that Congress intended to make
the recantation defense unreachable, yet that is the result if the statute was
read in the conjunctive. "' Thus, since there were no indications that the
statute should be read in the conjunctive, it applied the rule of lenity.20
Accordingly, the Smith court ruled that the meaning of "or" should not be
read as "and"; otherwise, "'[the Supreme] Court's long-established practice
of resolving questions concerning the ambit of a criminal statute in favor of
lenity"' would be contravened. 
2'
The next two sub-sections discuss the two-part test and the importance
of defining what "or" means to in order to determine whether the recanta-
tion defense is attainable.
1. Has the Testimony Substantially Affected the Proceedings?
The speaker testified to the following:
Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
2 2
The first prong of the two-part test ensures that "the [false] declaration
has not substantially affected the proceeding.' 2' How much time after the
testimony would the speaker have to recant his testimony? What if the
speaker recants his testimony three weeks after the false testimony, but be-
114. See id. at 346.
115. See id.
116. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987)).
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. See United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 346-47 (8th Cir. 1994).
120. See id. at 346.
121. Id. (quoting Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112 (1979)).
122. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
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fore the jury begins deliberations? In that case, the false testimony would
have substantially affected the proceedings due to the false testimony's role
in the proceedings, where the jury "had to process the evidence submitted
during the intervening three weeks against the backdrop of [the] false state-
ments."'24
What happens if the false testimony causes the grand jury to not in-
dict? If the government can prove that the grand jury "was unable to indict
... when it otherwise could have because of defendant's alleged false state-
ments," then the proceedings were substantially affected by the false state-
ments. 25
What happens if the speaker attempts to recant after the grand jury has
acted? "As a matter of law such a [false] statement must be presumed to
have been considered by the Grand Jury and to have substantially affected
the proceedings where the Grand Jury has subsequently acted."'26 Thus, a
defendant's use of the recantation provision in § 1623 is time limited to the
point that the false testimony has been considered by the receiver and acted
upon.
What happens if the witness in this Article's running example recants
his false testimony about the clothing before the end of his testimony, but
only after being confronted by the truth? While the answer to this question
has not been fully examined by the courts, if the testimony has not had a
chance to influence the grand jury or jury, it is more likely that the testi-
mony would not have substantially affected the proceedings at the time of
recantation. '27
As such, any significant delay between the false testimony and the
subsequent recantation that could provide time for the jury or grand jury to
be misled will substantially affect the proceeding.'28 Similarly, when a
grand jury is unable to indict because of the false testimony, then the false
testimony substantially affected the proceeding.'29 That means any recanta-
tion after the grand jury or jury acts will have already substantially affected
124. United States v. Lewis, 876 F. Supp. 308, 311 (D. Mass. 1994).
125. United States v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
126. United States v. Krogh, 366 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D.D.C. 1973).
127. See United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 308-10, 313, 317 (3d Cir. 1998).
However, the speaker may have a problem with the second prong of the recantation test on
whether it was manifest that the falsity has been exposed when he was confronted with the
truth. See, e.g., United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1990).
128. See, e.g., Lewis, 876 F. Supp. at 311 (holding that a thirteen-month delay after
grand jury appearance and three-week delay after court appearance substantially affected
proceedings); Tucker, 495 F. Supp. at 611, 613 (holding that a four-week delay after grand
jury appearance substantially affected proceedings); United States v. Crandall, 363 F. Supp.
648, 654-55 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (holding that a two-month delay after grand jury appearance
substantially affected proceedings).
129. See Krogh, 366 F. Supp. at 1256.
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the proceeding. 3 ° Thus, the window to recant is short lived, as the recanta-
tion must occur before the jury has time to utilize the false testimony in the
proceeding.
Accordingly, the way to keep the false testimony from substantially
affecting the proceeding is either to recant during the same testimony in
which the lie is given or within a short time period after the false testimony.
There does seem to be a way to satisfy this prong of the test to reach the
goal of the recantation defense, but there is no evidence that a perjurer has
had the opportunity to recant at such an early opportunity when the false
testimony has not already been exposed. Thus, the issue of whether both
prongs of the test have to be satisfied becomes important when viewed
alongside the requirements for each prong.
2. Is It Manifest That the Falsity Has Been or Will Be Exposed?
The second prong of the two-part test is to ensure that "it has not be-
come manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed."'' The test
usually hinges on what information the witness or the witness's attorney
objectively knew about,'32 but depending on the court, the test can also in-
clude what the prosecutor or grand jury objectively knew about. 33
To return to our example, the speaker testified to the following:
Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
134
130. See id.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1994) (placing the
burden on the defendant about what she knows about the exposure of the false testimony);
United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 613-16 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that it was manifest
to the defendant that false testimony was exposed when the government confronted him with
the evidence of his false testimony); United States v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607, 614
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that when the defendant's attorney was told before the recantation
that the government knows about the perjury, then the defendant knows).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 166, 176-77 (D.D.C. 1974)
(noting that three witnesses testified to the grand jury contradicting the defendant's testi-
mony). But see Smith, 35 F.3d at 347 (holding that the court must only look at what is objec-
tively manifest to the defendant).
134. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 12.
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Has it become manifest that the speaker's testimony is false if the
government tells him after his testimony that another witness gave contra-
dictory testimony? What happens if the government has a tape recording
that contradicts the speaker's testimony?135 "Once it becomes manifest to a
witness that his false testimony has been or will be exposed, he may no
longer take advantage of the recantation defense . "..."136 As such, in both
of these situations it would have become manifest to the speaker that his
false testimony had been exposed.
Does it become manifest if on re-cross the speaker makes the follow-
ing statements?
Q: Didn't you tell your girlfriend that you received clothes from Mr. Martin while
you were in college?
A: Yes.
It became manifest to the speaker that his false testimony was exposed
because he corrected his statements "[o]n re-cross examination by the Gov-
ernment" and admitted that he had lied only after being confronted with his
statements to a third party.
3 7
Has it become manifest when the speaker is confronted with photo-
graphs that reveal his false testimony? The rule is that "when it is manifest
to a witness that his false testimony has been or will be exposed, he may no
longer come under the shelter of the recantation provision."'3 Accordingly,
the photograph that contradicts the speaker's testimony squarely makes it
manifest to the speaker that his false testimony was exposed.
Has it become manifest if the speaker's attorney is told before his re-
cantation that the recantation is too late? Since it was manifest to the
speaker's attorney before the speaker recanted that the government knew
that he gave false testimony, then it is apparent to the speaker that his false
testimony had been exposed.'39 What if the speaker had been shown docu-
ments indicating that the government knows that he had given false testi-
mony? If the documents "made perfectly clear to all concerned that the
falsity of [the] testimony had been exposed," then it would have been mani-
fest to the speaker that his false testimony was exposed.4
Overall, it becomes manifest to the witness that the falsity is exposed
when the witness becomes aware of any type of evidence that reveals the
135. See United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
136. United States v. Scivola, 766 F.2d 37, 46 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Denison, 663
F.2d at 617; United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977)).
137. United States v. Fornaro, 894 F.2d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 1990).
138. United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 1981).
139. See United States v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607, 614 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
140. United States v. Crandall, 363 F. Supp. 648, 655 (W.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 493
F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1974).
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falsity. 4 ' The type of evidence that will make a witness aware of the expo-
sure of their false testimony includes a tape recording, 42 confrontation with
witness's statements to third parties, 43 photographs,'" and documents (e.g.,
an indictment).'45 In addition, the government can also simply tell the wit-
ness or the witness's attorney that the falsity is exposed.4 6 Additionally,
indictments of individuals that can expose the falsity of a speaker's testi-
mony will expose the falsity.'47 Accordingly, it seems that any type of in-
formation that could lead a person to believe that his false testimony has
been exposed is sufficient for this prong of the test not to be met.
There are no known examples of cases with enough information to
formulate what type of situation would have to occur for a defendant's false
statements not to become manifest that exposure had or was going to oc-
cur."'48 Based on the boundaries of the cases, though, situations in which the
falsity was not manifest to the witness may be possible (assuming a circuit
that only examines what the witness objectively knew).'49 Examples of such
situations include where the witness recants the falsity while still on the
witness stand without any warning from the prosecutor'50 or after leaving
the stand but before the prosecutor or third party gives the witness any sort
of warning, here the witness recants the falsity. 5 ' Given these parameters, it
is possible that a witness could satisfy this requirement of the two prong
test.
On the other hand, if a circuit examines what the witness, prosecutor,
and grand jury objectively knew, then the above two situations would not be
141. See Scivola, 766 F.2d at 45-46; Fornaro, 894 F.2d at 511; Denison, 663 F.2d at
616-17; Tucker, 495 F. Supp. at 614; Crandall, 363 F. Supp. at 655.
142. See, e.g., Scivola, 766 F.2d at 46 (holding that when a witness is informed about
a tape recording that contradicted witness's testimony, the false testimony is manifest to the
witness).
143. See, e.g., Fornaro, 894 F.2d at 510 (noting that a witness can be confronted with
statements that he told third parties).
144. See, e.g., Denison, 663 F.2d at 614 (noting that a witness can be confronted with
photographs that contradict his testimony).
145. See, e.g., Crandall, 363 F. Supp. at 655 (noting that a defendant can be shown an
indictment exposing false testimony).
146. See, e.g., Tucker, 495 F. Supp. at 614 (noting that the government can tell de-
fendant's attorney that it is too late to recant); United States v. Lewis, 876 F. Supp. 308, 311
(D. Mass. 1994) (noting that a prosecutor can tell defendant's attorney that the testimony is
in doubt before the recantation).
147. See Lewis, 876 F. Supp. at 311 (noting that the indictment of two people who
could expose false testimony can constitute exposure of false testimony).
148. See Richard H. Underwood, Perjury! The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DUQ. L.
REv. 715, 747 (1998).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 35 F.3d 344, 347 (8th Cir. 1994); Denison, 663
F.2d at 616.
150. See Bitler v. State, 429 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968).
151. See Smith, 35 F.3d at 344.
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possible, and the challenge of satisfying this requirement would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible. In both of the aforementioned exam-
ples, if the prosecutor or the grand jury had information that contradicted
the testimony, then at the moment the false testimony is given, there is no
possibility for the witness to satisfy this prong of the recantation defense.
Accordingly, the limitations of the recantation defense under § 1623 are
readily apparent-in fact, it is nearly impossible for an individual to calcu-
late how to successfully utilize the recantation provision of § 1623.
D. Is There Reason to Worry About 18 U.S.C. § 1621?
Another distinct but related issue to the use of the recantation defense
in § 1623 is whether any constitutional rights are being violated when a
defendant is charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1621152 instead of § 1623, and that
witness has the ability to use the recantation defense under § 1623. This
issue is distinct from the recantation defense, because it relates to what
criminal statute the government can charge a defendant with when more
than one criminal statute is violated. Courts have held that "' [w]hen an act
violates more than one criminal statute, the government may prosecute un-
der either statute so long as it does not discriminate against any class of
defendants."" 53 Under this rule, "a prosecutor's charging decision cannot
be 'motivated solely by a desire to [achieve] a tactical advantage by impair-
ing the ability of a defendant to mount an effective defense, [in such a case]
a due process violation might be shown."" 54  A prosecutor's apparently
tactical choice to charge a defendant under § 1621 instead of § 1623 would
apparently run afoul of this rule.
152 Section 1621 provides:
Whoever-
(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any case
in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he
will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, or that any written testimony, declara-
tion, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to
such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
true; or
(2) in any declaration, certificate, verification, or statement under penalty of per-
jury as permitted under section 1746 of title 28, United States Code, willfully sub-
scribes as true any material matter which he does not believe to be true;
is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by law, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. This section
is applicable whether the statement or subscription is made within or without the
United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
153. United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979)).
154. Id. at 313 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d
632, 639 (1st Cir. 1980)).
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The previous cases on this issue avoided making any constitutional
decisions, finding instead that the defendants did not meet the requirements
of the recantation defense.'55 However it is "a little disturbing the prospect
of the government employing § 1621 whenever a recantation exists, and §
1623 when one does not, simply to place perury defendants in the most
disadvantageous trial position."'56 Accordingly, the issue of which perjury
statute the defendant is charged under can be construed as a potential consti-
tutional issue that could be avoided if the recantation defense was easier to
obtain.
E. Is Recantation Possible?
The recantation defense in 18 U.S.C. § 1623 appears to be a reachable
goal upon first review, but the simple wording of the statute is misleading.
The wording of § 1623(d),'57 at least in plain language, tells a person to ad-
mit they lied before the lie causes problems with the court or grand jury, or
before the lie is exposed. The requirements themselves appear achievable;
but after reviewing the requirements as interpreted by the courts, only the
most careful or lucky perjurer can avail himself of the defense.'58
The law is uncertain as to whether the defendant or the prosecutor has
the burden of proof when the defendant raises a recantation defense. The
Ninth Circuit held that "'the prosecution must prove the inapplicability of
this [recantation] defense beyond a reasonable doubt."" 59  On the other
hand, the Fifth and D.C. Circuits have held that "'the defendant must show
that he is within an exception. ' '"1 60 This issue is a small portion of the hur-
dle, as cases on recantation indicate that the prosecutor tries to show that the
155. See id. at 317 (holding that § 1623(d) should be read in conjunctive form, and
that defendant did not satisfy both requirements); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 283
(2d Cir. 1973) (holding that it had become manifest that the falsity was exposed by the time
defendant recanted); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding
that defendant only recanted after hearing tape recordings that contradicted his testimony).
156. Kahn, 472 F.2d at 283.
157. Section 1623(d) provides:
Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a declara-
tion is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be false,
such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the admission
is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding, or it has not
become manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.
18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) (2000).
158. See supra Parts II.A-D.
159. United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Guess, 629 F.2d 573, 577 n.4 (9th Cir. 1980)).
160. linda f. harrison, The Law of Lying: The Difficulty of Pursuing Perjury Under
the Federal Perjury Statutes, 35 U. TOL. L. REv. 397, 414 (2003) (quoting United States v.
Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Moore, 613 F.2d 1029,
1044-45 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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witness did not recant while the witness tries to show that he or she did re-
cant.
One case indicates that the recantation defense under § 1623 may be
possible. In United States v. Del Toro,161 three counts of perjury "had been
dismissed by the court before trial on the ground that [co-defendant] Kauf-
man had effectively recanted his false testimony within the terms of 18
U.S.C. § 1623(d) during his testimony before the Grand Jury. 162 These
three dismissed counts were based "on Kaufman's initial denials of having
any knowledge of corruption in Model Cities and of having been asked for
or having discussed money with Morales.' 63 The recantation occurred di-
rectly following his false testimony-but only after the Assistant United
States Attorney "warned [Kaufman] that [Kaufman] might be subject to a
perjury prosecution" and "conspicuously put some boxes of tape recordings
on the table. '' "6 Accordingly, the dicta in Del Toro would indicate that the
recantation defense was successfully used by Kaufman, but the court unfor-
tunately did not discuss whether it was manifest that the false testimony
would be exposed or if it had substantially affected the proceedings.
65
Thus, the recantation provision of § 1623 can seemingly be reached,
but how Kaufman's recantation differs from some of the other cases is only
slightly apparent. In addition, it should be noted that Kaufman's other three
perjury convictions were affirmed by the Second Circuit.'" Thus, the pos-
sibility exists that the government allowed the three counts to be dismissed
since there was a stronger case for conspiracy, bribery, and other perjury
charges. 67 Accordingly, Del Toro is not an example of a successful use of
the recantation provision of § 1623.
In United States v. Smith,'68 the Eighth Circuit remanded a case where
the defendant testified that she had paid for part of a car from her savings
and denied that the money came from her boyfriend. 69 "After a thirty-
eight-minute break in the proceeding, during which Smith reviewed her
bank records, she resumed her testimony and recanted her previous state-
ments."' 70 The question then arose whether Smith had satisfied either one of
the prongs of the recantation defense.' 7' This determination was remanded
161. 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975).
162. Id. at 658.
163. Id. at 665 n.7.
164. Id. at 665.
165. See id. at 665-66.
166. See id. at 667.
167. See id. at 658.
168. 35 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 1994).
169. See id. at 345.
170. Id.
171. Seeid. at 347.
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to the trial court. 7 2 Accordingly, Smith is not an example of the successful
use of§ 1623(d).
The previous sections covered how a perjurer must make an outright
admission of the falsity of the statements before the false statement substan-
tially affects the proceeding and/or is manifest to the perjurer that it has
been or will be exposed.' If the recantation defense is achievable, it is a
question of law for the trial judge.'74 The dilemma is that there are no cases
where a witness has successfully asserted a recantation defense. If the in-
tent of Congress was for § 1623(d) to be an inducement to correct a false
statement, then why has the inducement not been successful in any case?'75
III. PROPOSED CHANGES TO § 1623
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that the recantation de-
fense under § 1623(d) is nearly impossible to achieve because of the contra-
dicting interpretations of the statute. If a witness has to satisfy both prongs,
172. See id at 347-48.
173. See supra Parts II.B-C.
174. See United States v. Denison, 663 F.2d 611, 618 (5th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Tucker, 495 F. Supp. 607, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
175. The data relating to 18 U.S.C. § 1623 prosecutions tell an interesting story about
why there are not any confirmed cases where the defendant successfully asserted the recanta-
tion defense. There were only ninety-two terminated § 1623 cases in 2002. Federal Justice
Statistics Research Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org/analysis/t-sec/ stat.cfn?year-2002&stat=-2
(select "Select by chapter and section within U.S.C. Title 18;" then select "79-Perjury;"
then select "18 1623") (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). Sixty-six of those cases terminated in
guilty pleas. Federal Justice Statistics Research Center,
http://fjsrc.urban.org/analysis/t-sec/stat.cfm?stat=-3&year=2002 (select "Select by chapter
and section within U.S.C. Title 18;" then select "79-Perjury;" then select "18 1623") (last
visited Oct. 6, 2006). Therefore, only twenty-six out of the ninety-two cases were not plea
bargained and fourteen of those were dismissed or nolle prosequi. Id. This shows that out of
the ninety-two terminated § 1623 prosecutions in 2002, only twelve actually went to trial.
Thus, the number of cases filed each year is low, and the number of cases that end up in
court is even lower. See also infra Table 1.
In addition, considering that the number of total terminated cases for 2002 is
80,424, Federal Justice Statistics Research Center, http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfln (follow
"Defendants in criminal cases closed" hyperlink; then select "2002;" then select "terminating
offense;" then select "all values") (last visited Oct. 6, 2006), and the number of § 1623 ter-
minated cases is only ninety-two, then § 1623 cases only accounted for 0.11% of the termi-
nated cases in 2002 and only 0.18% of the terminated cases in 1994. Thus, the low number
of § 1623 perjury cases indicates that they are probably a low priority for the court system
and that is probably why the circuits are still split about several key aspects of the recantation
defense of § 1623. The low number of § 1623 prosecutions and terminations also indicates
why neither the United States Supreme Court nor Congress has acted to alleviate the high
burden on the defendant to successfully utilize the recantation defense. (Please note that data
contained in this table is only from when the most serious offense charged/terminated is 18
U.S.C. § 1623. No data is available for prosecutions where the above referenced statute is
not the most serious offense charged/terminated.)
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which require that the false testimony has not substantially affected the pro-
ceeding and it has not become manifest that such falsity has been or will be
exposed, then based on the case law for each prong it is highly unlikely that
the witness would be able to successfully recant his false testimony. While
Congress's legislative intent was overwhelmingly against the interpretation
that both prongs have to be satisfied,176 the case law construing the provision
frustrates its intent by requiring that both prongs of the recantation provision
be satisfied.
The inconsistent application of the law by the circuit courts creates
problems, because the division causes individuals to speculate about what
conduct is prohibited.'77 Congress should amend 18 U.S.C. § 1623. This
amendment need only slightly modify the statutory text of § 1623, but it
would fulfill the original legislative intent for the recantation provision: to
be an inducement for witnesses to correct their false statements. Accord-
ingly, the modifications proposed below would lower the bar of recantation
to the point where it could be attainable by a witness.
The first modification would fix the two-prong test so that only one of
the two prongs need be satisfied for a successful recantation. As discussed
in Part II.E, the ability of a person to satisfy both prongs is next to impossi-
ble and has not yet been successful. The second modification is to narrow
the manifestation of exposure to only the person who gave the false testi-
mony. Although the case law indicates that any type of knowledge by the
person would make the falsity manifest, the burden is too high when the
knowledge of the jury and prosecution is included in this prong. The last
modification would take away the government's tactical advantage of
charging a defendant under both § 1621 and § 1623 for the same statements
made under oath. Accordingly, the amendments to § 1623 below are the
proper steps to realize the legislative intent for recantation to be an induce-
ment to truthful testimony.
18 U.S.C. § 1623 (additions in bold)
(d) Where, in the same continuous court or grand jury proceeding in which a decla-
ration is made, the person making the declaration admits such declaration to be
false, such admission shall bar prosecution under this section if, at the time the ad-
mission is made, either the declaration has not substantially affected the proceed-
ing, or it has not become manifest to the person that such falsity has been or will
be exposed.
(f) Prosecution under this statute shall bar prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1621
for the same declarations.
176. See supra Part I.A.
177. See supra Part II.C.
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CONCLUSION
Declarants have very little hope of recanting under current interpreta-
tions. Courts have consistently given materiality a broad application, mean-
ing almost any false statement is going to have an impact on the grand jury
or jury, even if it is just on the issue of credibility.'78 Likewise, courts have
consistently found that once a speaker utters a lie, the window to recant is
infinitesimally small, reserved only for immediate recantation in virtually
the same breath.'79 Even if a speaker were to recant at that moment, the
defense would still be lost if the government can prove that it has become
manifest that such falsity has been or will be exposed.8 ' They can prove
manifestation if they had knowledge already of the lie, the jury heard con-
tradictory testimony which exposed the lie, or the government informed the
attorney for the speaker that they were aware of the lie, even where there
has been no opportunity for the attorney to have told the speaker of the gov-
ernment's knowledge of the statement's falsity. 8' This effectively pre-
cludes any use of recantation as a defense. Clearly, this is not the intent of
Congress in enacting § 1623.
The additional hardship facing the speaker is that if recantation were
to be available, the government has the choice to charge under § 1621 in
any instance where the false statement meets those requirements.'82 These
charges can be made instead of § 1623 or in addition to it, creating a catch-
22 for the speaker. In order to remove this advantage, the government
should have to choose which statute to charge, thus allowing the speaker to
use the defense of recantation under § 1623, if it is charged.
One last look at the testimony using the proposed statute establishes
that the recommended changes accomplish Congress's intent in enacting §
1623:
Q. Did you ever receive any clothing from Eddie Martin?
A. Eddie Martin?
Q. When you were in college?
A. College?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't believe so, no.
183
178. See supra Part II.A.
179. See supra Part II.C. I.
180. See supra Part II.C.2.
181. See supra Part II.C.2.
182. See supra Part II.D.
183. Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
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Applying the proposed statute, the speaker could recant successfully if
he immediately (or within a short time after making the statement) admits
that he received clothing from Eddie Martin while in college. This would
be true even if (1) the government knew he had received clothing when he
denied it; (2) the jury knew he had received clothing when he denied it; or
(3) the government told the speaker's attorney that the testimony was in
doubt. He could also recant even though the testimony was found to be
material, because it would not be manifest to the speaker that the testimony
was exposed. This opportunity to recant fulfills Congress's intent for §
1623 to serve as an "inducement to the witness to give truthful testimony by
permitting him voluntarily to correct a false statement without incurring the
risk of prosecution by doing so."''  Without change, the finding of the court
in United States v. Awadallah is foretelling-recantation as a defense is an
illusion.'85
TABLES
Table 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 Filed Cases'
6
184. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
186. Data from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center,
http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006) (Please note that data contained in
this table is only from when the most serious offense charged/terminated is 18 U.S.C. §
1623. No data is available for prosecutions where the above referenced statute is not the
most serious offense charged/terminated.)
Year Filed Cases
2002 88
2001 69
2000 81
1999 65
1998 106
1997 76
1996 115
1995 99
1994 102
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Table 2. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 Terminated Cases 187
Terminated
Year Total for Year Percentage
Cases
2002 92 80,424 0.11%
2001 73 77,145 0.09%
2000 77 76,952 0.10%
1999 89 75,723 0.12%
1998 85 69,769 0.12%
1997 127 64,956 0.20%
1996 90 61,434 0.15%
1995 87 56,480 0.15%
1994 110 61,404 0.18%
187. Id.
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Table 3. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 Prosecution Outcomes 88
I.
U
C
Cm
C CA
C C 5-
CA a -C
C. C.
od C
C C
C"
UJ
C
°-
C
CA
a-
C
IC -*
U
C
2002 66 8 4 14
2001 58 6 6 2 1
2000 54 10 11 1 1
1999 61 10 13 5
1998 57 12 2 8 5 1
1997 82 23 4 14 3 1
1996 52 1 15 3 12 6 1
1995 55 1 12 13 6
1994 68 14 18 10
188. Id.
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Table 4. 18 U.S.C. § 1623 Sentences'89
6 V
2002 14 1 50 25 2
2001 9 0 37 25 2
2000 13 1 38 24 0
1999 18 1 51 17 2
1998 14 41 28 1 1
1997 18 1 82 23 3
1996 19 53 16 1 1
1995 19 48 20
1994 28 3 47 32
189. Id.
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